(iPoster) Defend or Destroy: National Strategic Assets and Wartime Resolve

• In Event: Poster Sessions: International Security II & Normative Political Theory
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: International Security II

Abstract

How far are states willing to go to deny important national assets to their opponents? States pay hefty human and financial costs to defend important assets in war, often risking domestic backlash for overspending. We investigate a strategy alternative to costly defense or wholesale abandonment—preemptive sabotage. The willingness to sacrifice a contested asset is one of the greatest possible shows of resolve, reflecting a readiness to destroy the valuable resources that may justify the war itself. However, sabotage may also be an attractive strategy to those unwilling to pay the costs of defense. We investigate the decision to defend or destroy national assets using a factorial survey experiment in Taiwan (N = 1000), in which respondents make decisions about a threatened asset in a Chinese invasion scenario. We vary the strategic conditions facing Taiwan and the characteristics of the asset in question, notably its facility type (semiconductors manufacturer, weapons factory, cultural artifact, or communications equipment producer). Leveraging Taiwan’s possession of a valuable asset (chip production capabilities), our study sheds light on the decision to protect or destroy one of the most critical resources in the technological supply chain, but also conceptualizes the nature of wartime resolve beyond the decision to defend.

Authors

• Avishai Melamed, Cornell University

• Samuel Liu, Cornell University

• Sarah E. Kreps