(iPoster) An Invisible Hand: The Israeli Constitution and the Religious Market

• In Event: Poster Sessions: African Politics Conference Group & Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Politics
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Politics

Abstract

How do constitutions affect religious markets? In this paper, I offer an analysis of the Israeli case as an example of an unusually ambiguous constitutional structure. I argue that Israel’s constitution shapes the religious market by allowing policymaking in the absence of constraints. The result is a political system that recognizes religious rights at the communal level rather than the individual level. The state thus retains the right to determine what constitutes a “religious community.” Drawing on both quantitative and quantitative data, I explore the concept of recognition as a mechanism of market control. I demonstrate that recognized communities achieve entrenched status by exercising monopolistic practices across lifecycle events. The Israeli case thus offers an example of how a state’s constitution can shape the practice of religion itself. By the same token, the Israeli case does not offer evidence that state interference depresses religious practice.

Author

• Brendan Szendro, McGill University