(iPoster) Rebels or Rockets? Retaliation Strategies to External Rebel Sponsorship

• In Event: Poster Session: International Security III

Abstract

Foreign sponsorship of rebel groups has become a defining feature of post–World War II international conflict, yet such interventions seldom escalate into direct interstate war. How do states respond to foreign support for insurgents, and what accounts for variation in their retaliatory strategies? This article develops a theoretical framework to explain how and why states choose between retaliatory rebel sponsorship and the retaliatory use of military force when confronted with externally backed insurgencies. I argue that retaliatory rebel support—defined as the reciprocal sponsorship of rebel groups operating against the original sponsor—constitutes a form of within-domain reciprocity that allows states to signal resolve, impose costs, and preserve strategic flexibility while constraining escalation risks. By contrast, overt retaliatory uses of force, particularly when disproportionate, are more likely to trigger escalation dynamics that increase the probability of interstate conflict. Using global dyadic data on foreign rebel sponsorship and interstate retaliation, the analysis provides strong empirical support for these theoretical expectations. Foreign rebel support significantly increases the likelihood of reciprocal rebel sponsorship by the targeted state, relative to direct uses of force. Moreover, the selection of retaliation strategies is systematically conditioned by structural and contextual factors: states that are relatively weaker in conventional military capabilities are more likely to respond through rebel sponsorship, whereas the absence of viable rebel groups or transnational ethnic kin in the adversary state shifts retaliation toward direct military force. Together, these findings demonstrate that states strategically select among retaliatory options in ways that balance signaling, cost imposition, and the management of escalation risk.

Author

• Hilal Sert, Georgia State University