(iPoster) The Crowd Knows Best? Analyzing Complexity of Leadership Mass Mobilizations

• In Event: Poster Sessions: African Politics Conference Group & Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Politics
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Politics

Abstract

To what extent do leaderless mass mobilizations achieve meaningful regime change, and when they succeed, can they establish functional governance without descending into chaos or state failure? The past fifteen years have witnessed an unprecedented wave of decentralized uprisings—from the Arab Spring (2010-2012) to Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement (2014), South Korea's candlelight protests (2016-2017), and Sudan's 2019 revolution. These movements challenge foundational assumptions in revolution scholarship, which has long emphasized the necessity of hierarchical organization, vanguard parties, and charismatic leadership for overthrowing entrenched regimes. Yet while leaderless mobilizations have demonstrated remarkable capacity to destabilize authoritarian rule, their post-revolutionary trajectories vary dramatically—from Tunisia's fragile but functioning democracy to Libya and Syria's catastrophic state collapse. This divergence remains theoretically underspecified and empirically puzzling.

We address two sequential questions through mixed-methods analysis. First, under what configurations of structural and relational conditions do leaderless mobilizations successfully compel regime breakdown? Second, among cases achieving initial revolutionary success, what factors distinguish pathways toward institutional consolidation from those culminating in prolonged civil conflict, state failure, or authoritarian restoration? Using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), we examine 4-6 Arab Spring cases (2010-2013)—Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Bahrain—selected for their variation in both mobilization strategies and outcomes. We calibrate and analyze six theoretically-informed conditions: (1) digital communication infrastructure enabling coordination without hierarchy, (2) regime coercive capacity and willingness to employ violence, (3) depth of economic grievances, (4) security force cohesion and defection patterns, (5) international intervention (diplomatic, economic, or military), and (6) pre-existing institutional capacity including bureaucratic strength and civil society density. The fsQCA identifies necessary and sufficient configurational pathways to regime breakdown and subsequent governance outcomes—revealing, for instance, how Tunisia's relatively robust state institutions enabled democratic transition while Libya's institutional void precipitated state collapse despite both experiencing successful uprisings.

Next, we then employ Bayesian multivariate regression analysis on a broader cross-national dataset of protest episodes (N~150-200) compiled through systematic triangulation of NAVCO, SCAD, V-Dem, and Freedom House data sources. This approach tests the generalizability of fsQCA findings while accounting for measurement uncertainty and allowing probabilistic inference about whether leaderlessness systematically predicts revolutionary success and post-transition trajectories across diverse contexts.

Our findings reveal a paradox: while organizational decentralization can facilitate rapid mass mobilization and regime breakdown by lowering coordination costs and reducing repressive targeting, sustained post-revolutionary governance requires institutional substitutes for leadership—including durable state bureaucracies, inclusive political processes, or internationally-brokered power-sharing arrangements. These results challenge romanticized narratives of spontaneous democracy while offering actionable insights for understanding when and how leaderless movements can achieve not merely regime change, but meaningful political transformation.

Authors

• Dilshod Achilov, University of Massachusetts - Dartmouth

• Renat Shaykhutdinov, Florida Atlantic University

• Unregistered Participant