(iPoster) A Theory of Political Imprisonment under Elite Uncertainty

• In Event: Poster Sessions: Formal Political Theory & Foreign Policy II – Alliances, Coercion, and Foreign Policy Decision-Making
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Formal Theory

Abstract

Why do authoritarian regimes often respond to political threats by expanding systems of detention rather than by killing their opponents? Existing theories predict that rising threats lead to increasingly lethal repression, yet many regimes invest in prisons and rely on incarceration even when elimination appears feasible. I develop a signaling game in which an autocrat faces a commitment problem with elites whose support is necessary for political survival but who fear future elimination. Prison construction reshapes the leader’s future incentives, allowing detention to serve as a credible commitment to refrain from killing and thereby sustaining elite support. Extending the model to allow for imperfect targeting shows that when selective detention becomes infeasible, regimes shift toward indiscriminate mass detention without necessarily increasing lethal violence. The model implies a non-monotonic relationship between threat levels and killing, highlighting elite constraints and information conditions as central determinants of repression strategies. By clarifying how elite constraints and information conditions shape repression choices, the model also helps explain variation in autocratic practices during periods of political transition, including episodes of democratic backsliding in which regimes expand detention while avoiding large-scale lethal violence.

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