(iPoster) Whack-a-Mole? How Counterinsurgents Deal with New Rebel Groups

• In Event: Poster Session: International Security I

Abstract

That counterinsurgencies are difficult to win is not news. Debates between bullets and ballots and between draining the sea and hearts and minds abound. Yet while much of the literature explores the strategic approaches to counterinsurgency, little of it has delved into intra-conflict shifts in response to increases in the number of rebel groups. Yet the number of factions opposed to the government can grow as actors see opportunities to launch separate rebellions, based on differing locations, ethnicities, religious identities, and demands. In India in 1990, for example, at least nine rebel groups were active, including Kashmir insurgents, the ULFA in Assam, UNLF in Manipur, and Naga communists. In other cases, groups fracture, or split, creating multi-faction conflicts. From Nigeria’s Boko Haram emerged ISWAP and Ansaru. Often, conflicts are a combination of the two: in 2013, the US Defense Intelligence Agency estimated more than 1200 anti-government armed groups in Syria. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there are more than one hundred groups fighting in the Kivu region. In both cases, many factions are small, focused on defending their neighborhoods and villages.
Such an increase in opponents creates both opportunities and challenges for counterinsurgents. Some of the splitters may be more eager for peace and there is some indication that local ceasefires can spread regionally (Lundgren, Svensson, Karakus 2023), reducing immediate threats and giving the government and its allies the opportunity to focus their efforts elsewhere. In other cases, as with ISWAP, Ansaru, and Boko Haram, newly created groups fight amongst themselves, potentially weakening all.
However, the challenges often outnumber the benefits. Multiple conflicts in different regions divide military and economic capacity, overstretching the capabilities governments. Even when the multiple anti-state warring factions share geographic space, traditional counterinsurgency approaches may have little effect. The zero-sum logic of the inkblot approach suggested in the Clear-Hold-Build approach doesn’t work when there are multiple opponents; taking a town from one has little direct effect on the capabilities of the others. While fragmented insurgent groups may be individually weaker, the defeat of one may unintentionally enhance others as survivors flee to the remaining factions, hoping to continue the fight.
So what do counterinsurgents do? How do they respond to the fractionalization of existing rebel groups or the emergence of new ones during a counterinsurgency? While there has been a burgeoning literature on the causes (e.g., Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012; Duursma and Fliervoet 2020) and effects of rebel-group fractionalization and multiparty conflicts on war duration and outcomes (e.g., Findley and Rudloff 2012; Mahoney 2020), there has been little excepting Cunningham (2011) looking at how counterinsurgents respond to a sudden increase in rebel groups. Yet how they do should affect both war duration and outcomes. Do governments prioritize particular groups? When regionally separated, do they, as expected, actually focus on groups that are closest to the capital or otherwise pose the greatest threat? When geographically centralized, do counterinsurgents draw any distinction between the new offshoots and the original factions? Or, as expected, do they treat the rebel movement as one?
To develop a model of counterinsurgent behavior in light of the development of new rebel groups, this paper will examine case studies of such wars, including in Pakistan and India, and Mali and Nigeria. Utilizing event data from ACLED, government statements, and media coverage, it will try to understand how governments and their allies respond militarily to the rise of new anti-government factions.
Bakke, K. M., K. G. Cunningham, and L. J. M. Seymour. “A Plague of Initials: Fragmentation, Cohesion, and Infighting in Civil Wars.” Perspectives on Politics. 10/2 (2012).

Cunningham, K. G. “Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede: How Do States Respond to Internally Divided Separatists” American Political Science Review (2011).

Cunningham, K. G., K. M. Bakke, and L. J. M. Seymour. “Shirts Today, Skins Tomorrow: Dual Contests and the Effects of Fragmentation in Self-Determination Disputes. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 56/1 (2012).

Duursma, A. and F. Fliervoet. “Fueling Factionalism? The Impact of Peace Processes on Rebel Group Fragmentation in Civil Wars.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 65/4 (2021).

Findley, M. and P. Rudloff. “Combatant Fragmentation and the Dynamics of Civil Wars.” British Journal of Political Science. 42 (2012).

Lundgren, M., I. Svensson, and D. C. Karakus, “Local Ceasefires and De-escalation: Evidence from the Syrian Civil War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 67/7-8 (2023).

Mahoney, C. W. “Splinters and Schisms: Rebel Group Fragmentation and the Durability of Insurgencies.” Terrorism and Political Violence. 32/2 (2020).

Author

• Andrea M. Lopez, Susquehanna University