(iPoster) Populism and the Political Economy of Congressional Professionalization

• In Event: Poster Sessions: Legislative Studies & Authoritarian Demands, Compliance, and the Politics of Protest
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Legislative Studies

Abstract

The U.S. Congress is overwhelmed, outmatched by an increasingly dominant executive. Many scholars and reformers champion proposals to increase Congressional capacity, for example, increasing pay for members and their staff, expanding legislative support agencies, etc. However, the politics of these reform proposals is extremely tenuous; the mass public is skeptical and members often face clear incentives to oppose capacity increases. Why is increasing capacity unpopular? The previous literature focuses on institutional explanations, such as increasing partisan competition and legislative centralization. I present a theory that focuses on behavioral forces, in particular, increases in populist distrust of elites and public concern regarding political corruption. Taken together, these forces culminate in a vicious cycle of capacity attacks that have diminished Congress' professionalization and threaten to thwart efforts to buttress the institution. In this registered report, I outline a series of empirical tests for my theory both in descriptive terms -- what are the correlates or predictors of support for increasing capacity -- and causally -- what treatments can increase support for capacity improvements. Taken together, this article assesses whether or not capacity reforms can be packaged to improve both public reception of these proposals and the incentives members face to enact them.

Author

• Jack T. Rametta, Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation & Institute