(iPoster) Business Interests and Bilateral Labor Agreements

• In Event: Poster Sessions: Frontiers in International Political Economy & Advanced Industrial Societies
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Frontiers in International Political Economy

Abstract

If public opinion is so strongly opposed to higher immigration, why do governments in migrant-receiving states sign bilateral labor agreements (BLAs) that are likely to increase migrant inflows? This paper argues that the answer lies in the political access of business interests to the executive branch. We first establish micro-level evidence consistent with the mechanism: using large-scale survey data, we show that individuals in private-sector managerial positions are systematically more supportive of immigration and more likely to evaluate immigration as economically beneficial, relative to other occupational groups. We then test the argument with a dyad-year dataset covering 1945–2020 and over 1,200 BLAs. Across multiple panel estimators, we find that BLAs are signed more often when business has an “inside track” in government: when governing coalitions rely on business support, when governing parties disproportionately represent business interests, and when the head of government has a prior business background. We also find conditional effects: the impact of business-backed governments is strongest when institutional features are more permissive—i.e., when executives face fewer constraints and can more easily translate organized economic preferences into international commitments. Next, we examine treaty design rather than treaty formation. Using detailed content codings for 570 agreements, we estimate latent “labor friendliness” scales via exploratory factor analysis and item response theory (IRT). Contrary to our expectations, these content models yield null results: business-linked governments sign more BLAs, but they do not systematically produce agreements with weaker worker-protection profiles on the provisions we can observe. Finally, we illustrate the causal logic with a case study of South Korea under Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013), showing how a business-oriented executive can expand managed labor-mobility arrangements (via MoUs tied to Korea’s Employment Permit System) even when broader societal incentives might point toward caution.

Authors

• Nicola Nones, University of Toronto

• Melle Scholten, University of Twente