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In recent years, governments have increasingly experimented with involving stakeholders such as labor unions, environmental NGOs, and other civil society actors in the negotiation of trade and investment agreements. These consultation and advisory mechanisms are intended not only to incorporate social concerns into economic policymaking, but also to bolster the legitimacy of international economic governance amid declining public trust in liberal trade and investment regimes. Yet the depth and effectiveness of such participation vary widely. Evidence from cases such as the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and the EU–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations illustrates that civil society engagement can influence treaty content, leading to more explicit references to labor, environmental, and human-rights standards. However, most of these provisions remain non-binding and confined to the realm of soft law. This paper investigates why some bilateral investment and trade agreements embed social provisions while others do not, emphasizing the role of non-state actor activism. I argue that activism matters, but its influence is conditional on domestic political context, specifically, the level of civic engagement and institutional openness in the contracting states. Where domestic institutions provide participatory channels that translate external advocacy into treaty design, activists can shape agenda-setting, introduce social and regulatory language, and contribute to the creation of institutionalized governance mechanisms. In more restrictive contexts, activism yields largely symbolic or declaratory provisions with limited legal force. The paper develops a conditional model of activist influence, combining a dataset of over 4,000 trade and investment agreements with measures of civic participation and transnational activism intensity, alongside interviews with NGO representatives and advocacy leaders. The findings suggest that, under enabling domestic conditions, transnational activism not only reshapes treaty design but also serves as a mechanism through which governments seek to legitimate international economic agreements-reconciling investment protection with social purpose and sustaining public trust in liberal economic governance.