(iPoster) Affective Polarization and the Psychology of Democratic Attitudes

• In Event: Poster Sessions: Polarization, Identity, and Democratic Vulnerability & Political Communication I
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Polarization, Identity, and Democratic Vulnerability

Abstract

A growing body of research in political psychology shows that affective polarization—emotional hostility toward political out-groups—profoundly shapes how citizens perceive political opponents. Yet we still know relatively little about which democratic attitudes are most psychologically vulnerable to affective polarization, and through what emotional versus cognitive pathways these effects operate. This paper addresses this gap by distinguishing between two closely related but psychologically distinct democratic attitudes: pluralistic attitudes and political tolerance.

Pluralistic attitudes reflect a generalized acceptance of social and political diversity as legitimate, while political tolerance captures willingness to endure concrete interactions with political opponents. Drawing on original survey data from a nationally representative panel of South Korean voters conducted around the 21st presidential election, I examine how affective polarization differentially shapes these two attitudes, and how its effects are moderated by partisan identity strength and ideological identification.

I conceptualize affective polarization as an emotional response rooted in social identity, operationalized as affective distance between in-party and out-party evaluations using feeling thermometer scores. I contrast this with perceived ideological polarization, which captures cognitive assessments of ideological distance. Using OLS regression models with interaction terms, the analysis yields three key findings. First, affective polarization strongly and consistently undermines pluralistic attitudes, even when controlling for partisanship, ideology, and perceived ideological polarization. In contrast, perceived ideological polarization has no independent effect on pluralism, suggesting that pluralistic acceptance is especially sensitive to emotional hostility rather than cognitive disagreement.

Second, the psychological impact of affective polarization depends on partisan identity strength, but in distinct ways across attitudinal domains. Among strong partisans, affective polarization sharply erodes pluralistic attitudes, indicating that when partisan identity is deeply internalized, emotional out-group animus readily generalizes into a rejection of political coexistence itself. Political tolerance, however, is more strongly affected among weak partisans, suggesting that emotionally driven intolerance may emerge earlier among individuals whose partisan identities are less crystallized.

Third, the effects of affective polarization are heterogeneous across ideological groups. Among both strong and weak progressives, rising affective polarization significantly weakens pluralistic attitudes and political tolerance. Among conservatives, these effects are more limited and often statistically insignificant. This asymmetry highlights that affective polarization does not operate uniformly across ideological identities, but instead interacts with group-based moral and social identities to shape democratic attitudes.

Taken together, these findings contribute to political psychology by demonstrating that affective polarization operates through distinct emotional pathways to influence different democratic attitudes. The results underscore the importance of distinguishing emotional polarization from cognitive disagreement, and of disaggregating democratic attitudes, when assessing the psychological consequences of partisan animosity.

Author

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