(iPoster) Officers, Village Guards, and Kurdish Mobilization in Turkey

• In Event: Poster Session: International Security I

Abstract

Existing research on ethnic representation in security forces tends to examine either the consequences of exclusion from state institutions (Cederman et al. 2010, Chandra and Wilkinson 2009, Fearon et al. 2007, Tezcur and Gurses 2016) or the effectiveness of coethnic militias in managing ethnic conflict (Ahram 2011, Carey et al. 2013). Yet in practice, states frequently pursue dual strategies, simultaneously investing in professional integration while relying on paramilitary forces. We know surprisingly little about the combined effects of this approach for ethnic mobilization.
This paper examines the consequences of Turkey’s dual security strategy during its conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Since the PKK’s first attack in 1984, the Turkish state has sought to incorporate Kurds into the officer corps through inducive recruitment strategies—such as recruitment fairs and conferences in Kurdish-populated provinces (Ozkan 2022)—while also deploying a large network of local village guards to exploit local knowledge and deny insurgents access to resources (Balta et al. 2022, Belge 2016). While Kurdish integration into the professional military remained limited, village guard recruitment expanded rapidly, reaching tens of thousands by the 2010s (Gurcan 2015).
I argue that this dual strategy proved self-undermining in two ways. First, reliance on coethnic militias substituted for and weakened incentives for professional integration. Village guard service required shorter training, offered local employment, and enhanced personal safety, making it a more attractive pathway to state power and protection than a long and uncertain officer career often conducted far from home. Second, limited professional integration reinforced incentives for both violent and non-violent Kurdish mobilization, facilitating PKK recruitment and encouraging political participation through pro-Kurdish parties.
The analysis draws on an original subnational panel dataset covering Kurdish-populated provinces from 1980 to 2015, combining data on (1) Kurdish recruitment and promotion in the officer corps, (2) village guard recruitment intensity, (3) PKK mobilization and conflict fatalities, and (4) pro-Kurdish party vote shares. The findings reveal a strong institutional substitution effect—higher village guard recruitment is associated with lower Kurdish officer representation, and lower officer recruitment correlates with increased levels of both insurgent violence and electoral mobilization.
Theoretically, the paper extends work on institutional substitution (Helmke and Levitsky 2006, Slater 2010) by showing how parallel security institutions—often adopted to manage short-term risks—can systematically undermine state-building and integration goals. Turkey’s experience illustrates how reliance on militias may provide immediate security benefits while simultaneously weakening professional integration and amplifying ethnic mobilization over time.

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