(iPoster) Plausible Governance as the Third P of Autocratic Power Consolidation in Vietnam

• In Event: Poster Session: Politics of Communist and Former Communist Countries (Asia)

Abstract

How do autocrats overcome elite resistance to their attempts to personalize power? Existing theory argues that in countries with strong institutions, elites will resist consolidation. Using the case of Vietnam's provincial mergers, which could increase the General Secretary's personal power, we propose an additional mechanism that can facilitate such reforms—plausibly improving governance. We suggest that reforms that solely personalize power without abiding by a corresponding justified governance logic face resistance. Conversely, autocrats can achieve their aims if they plausibly carry the reforms out in a way that appeals to technocrats in the coalition.

Using a series of Monte Carlo Markov Chain simulations generating more than 133,000 possible mergers, we demonstrate that the mergers simultaneously achieved outcomes consistent with good governance while also shielding To Lam’s coalition from the harshest effects of the mergers. The findings demonstrate an important pathway to authoritarian consolidation and presage the possible effects of Vietnam’s reforms for the country’s future governance and political coalitions.

Authors

• Duy Trinh, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

• Paul J. Schuler, University of Arizona

• Linh Ngoc Truong, University of Arizona