Attorneys in the the "Hidden Judiciary": The Case of Japan's Administrative Tribunals

• In Event: Selection Processes & Bureaucratic Behavior

Abstract

Studies show that judges’ professional backgrounds as prosecutors or legal scholars have an important bearing on judicial behavior. Yet little is known about the behavior of those with private attorney backgrounds after they assume judicial or quasi-judicial positions. This paper leverages an aspect of judicial politics that has largely been overlooked by the literature, administrative adjudication, to better understand the effects of a private attorney background on judicial-type rulings. Drawing on original data of Japanese prefectural-level administrative tribunals, or Administrative Complaint Review Boards (ACRBs), we show that ACRBs with more private attorneys rule more often against the government. Consistent with a socialization perspective, we find preliminary evidence that ACRBs with more experienced private attorneys rule more often against the government. We also find that prefectural governors who have served fewer terms are more likely to appoint more private attorneys to ACRBs, and that governors’ ideological orientations have little effect over the appointment of private attorneys.

Author

• Rieko Kage, University of Tokyo