Economic Sanctions, Reciprocity, and Retaliation: Exploring How States Adapt and Cope with Sanctions

• In Event: Conversations about the International Order

Abstract

Despite the widespread use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool, the responses of sanctioned states (targets) towards sanctioning states (senders) vary. In response to Western sanctions over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia retaliated by imposing a food embargo and temporarily cutting off natural gas supplies. North Korea, while not resorting to reciprocal economic sanctions, employs different measures to retaliate, such as cyber-attacks. Meanwhile, some countries do not impose any meaningful countermeasures against the senders. My research aims to address two key questions: (1) Why do some sanctioned states retaliate against senders while others do not? (2) If they do so, how do their countermeasures differ from country to country?

To answer these questions, my research employs a mixed-method research design. I use cross-national statistical analysis examining 332 sanction episodes imposed by the US and EU from 2000 to 2021, using the Global Sanctions Data Base. Additionally, I conduct country case studies on Russia (economic retaliation), North Korea (non-economic retaliation), and Myanmar (no retaliation), incorporating various interviews. I find that political regimes in the sanctioned state shape whether and how they retaliate. Authoritarian regimes are more likely to retaliate. On the other hand, regimes that are dependent on military are less likely to retaliate. This research contributes to the literature on reciprocity and aids in formulating more effective sanctions policies by understanding the drivers and patterns of targets’ retaliatory acts.

Author

• Heejae Park, Johns Hopkins University