The Logic of Self-Coups

• In Event: Perspectives on Populism

Abstract

There is considerable research on the determinants of coups, both international and domestic factors. However, there is very little theoretical or empirical work on coup attempts in Western countries and the domestic dynamics that shape self-coups. This paper looks at the case
of January 6th in the US to provide the theoretical basis for the logic of self-coups in democratic contexts. I argue that autocratic executives under threat look for signals of support to retain power, social protests can be used to send signals to political elites, and the elites who picked up this signal began creating a negative feedback loop leading to a coup attempt by the executive. To support my argument, I provide a thorough analysis of the timing between Donald Trump’s rhetoric and social protests in 2020, the state capital breaches in Michigan, Idaho, and Oregon over 2020 in the lead-up to January 6th, and how Donald Trump combined both COVID conspiracies with election denialism to broader his base of support to conduct January 6th. My study has large implications for both policymakers and scholars interested in studying how executives in democratic contexts can retain power through potential coups.

Author

• Thomas Campbell, University of Nevada - Reno