The Limits of In(ter)dependence: French and U.S. NATO-Policies Compared

• In Event: Conversations about the International Order

Abstract

How do state leaders delineate between alliance and sovereignty? Rationalist alliance theory suggests that alliances and sovereignty are antithetical. State leaders deciding for or against alliances consider a tradeoff of increased security and decreased autonomy. In this article, we argue that this is merely one way to view the alliance-sovereignty relationship, one that is seldom as straightforward, and seldom unambiguous. Comparing French and U.S. NATO policies, we find that both states’ leaders have feared a sovereignty-reducing effect of alliances, yet consistently attempted to—and indeed hitherto succeeded in—reconciling sovereignty and alliance. However, whereas French leaders have pursued “strategic autonomy,” claiming that they can be “allied, but not aligned,” U.S. leaders have considered alliances safe as long as they are U.S.-led. Maintaining U.S. sovereignty in an alliance is possible as long as the United States dictates its terms. Underpinning the similarities between the two states’ NATO policies lies a (perhaps universal) fundamental suspicion of alliances as sovereignty-reducing. The differences, however, betray unique conceptions of the relationship between sovereignty and alliance originating in unique geopolitical circumstances, foreign policy goals, national identity, and historical experience. Our findings challenge and nuance rationalist explanations of alliance-sovereignty tradeoffs and propose a novel approach to the study of state behavior in and vis-à-vis alliances.

Authors

• Vårin Alme, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment

• Ingeborg Misje Bergem, University of Oslo