Quotas, Network Centrality, and Political Selection in India’s Villages

• In Event: Politics of Inequality in Developing Contexts

Abstract

Social networks shape individual outcomes, with centrality offering advantages that could magnify extant power dynamics and patterns of human capital formation. In response to historical inequalities, countries have enacted laws - like electoral quotas - to further the status of marginalized in the network (scheduled castes and tribes in case of India). This study explores how quotas impact centrality in political candidacy decisions and alter social network structures. Prevailing theories suggest centrality influences the decision to run for office and election outcomes, especially in clientelistic settings, where voters prefer centrally positioned candidates due to their perceived social proximity to those in political office. Quotas, however, may make centrally positioned candidates ineligible, inducing support for potentially less-central proxy candidates. Alternatively, quotas may motivate elites from disenfranchised seats to make the most of institutional protection. In this study, we use quasi-exogenous temporal variation from rotating quotas in Indian village council elections, for identification. Preliminary findings show that quota candidates often emerge from non-central households in protected communities. We then explore the role of social elites in this observed pattern by taking a network theory-based approach with rich data from a national survey in India that affords us information on social networks, household-level identity markers and candidacy decisions.

Authors

• Vinay Jha, Indian Institute of Management -- Ahmedabad

• Abhishek Tripathy, Indian Institute of Management -- Ahmedabad

• Priyadarshi Amar, University Carlos III (Madrid)