Why Congressmen Do Not Retaliate the Supreme Court? An Experimental Survey in Brazil

• In Event: Comparative Politics Lightning Round

Abstract

In recent years, in Brazil, the Supreme Court (STF) has become a political protagonist. Its decisions have not only had a direct impact on the political, party, and electoral organization but have also been controversial, contentious, and contradictory. Furthermore, some of these decisions exceeded the court's jurisdiction and clashed with the decisions of the Legislative Branch. Therefore, it can be stated that the STF has become an ally of minority parties. The court is predominantly progressive, while the Congress is predominantly conservative. In this scenario, one would expect a reaction from Congress to the legislative actions of the STF. However, this is not the reality in Brazil. On the contrary, recent changes in the legislation regulating the STF's activities have empowered the institution. While the literature on judicial reform discusses this issue, it lacks experimental studies to support the proposed theories. The aim of this study is to understand the causal relationships that prevent congressmen from retaliating against the court's interference. Through an experimental survey with congress members, we seek to empirically produce evidence to explain this phenomenon.

Authors

• ANDRE LUIZ MEDEIROS KLEVENHUSEN, Fundacao Getulio Vargas

• Carlos Pereira, Getulio Vargas Foundation