What Makes Trans-Provincial Water Cooperation Possible in China?: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Ecological Compensation Cases

• In Event: Perspectives on Climate Issues

Abstract

To address the issue of interprovincial water pollution, the Chinese central government has promoted the Eco-Compensation Mechanism as a key instrument to facilitate cooperation between riparian provinces since 2010. However, not all relevant river segments or watersheds have established inter-provincial ecological compensation mechanisms. This paper uses the method of Qualitative Comparative Analysis to analyze these cases and gain insight into the motivations behind interprovincial water cooperation. The primary finding reveals that the industrial composition of upstream provinces and water quality significantly determine whether or not these provinces engage in cooperative efforts. In particular, when the water quality at the provincial border fails to meet the national assessment target, both the upstream and downstream provinces are likely to collaborate on shared rivers due to the central government's strict targets and financial incentives. Besides, the presence of a large water-pollution-intensive enterprise in the upstream county bordering the provinces is a necessary condition for the absence of interprovincial water cooperation. This research argues that the central government is not all-powerful and its ability to foster cooperation between provincial governments is limited. Furthermore, under the Chinese current GDP-led political promotion incentive and tax-sharing system between the central and local governments, local authorities prioritize economic growth over environmental protection. As a result, there are doubts about the effectiveness of the Eco-Compensation Mechanism. This study aims to contribute to the theories of environmental authoritarianism and inter-jurisdictional collaboration in China.

Author

• Tianrong Pan, Technical University of Munich