Electoral Competition with Credible Promises and Strategic Voters

• In Event: Voting Challenges

Abstract

How can voters induce politicians to put forth more proximate (in terms of preference) as well as credible platforms (in terms of promise fulfillment) under repeated elections? I study how reputation and re-election concerns affect candidate behavior and its resultant effect on voters' beliefs and their consequent electoral decisions. I present a formal model where, instead of assuming voters to be naïve, I tackle the question by completely characterizing a set of subgame perfect equilibria by introducing non-naïve voting behavior in the mix. I find that non-naïve voting behavior - via utilizing the candidate’s reputation as an instrument of policy discipline post-election - aids in successfully inducing candidates to put forth their maximal incentive compatible promise (amongst a range of such credible promises) in equilibrium. Through the credible threat of punishment in the form of loss in reputation for all future elections – non-naïve voters are able to gain a unanimous rise in their expected utility than when they behave naively. In fact, comparative statics show that candidates who are more likely to win are more likely to keep their promises. In such a framework, voters are not only able to better bargain for more credible promises but also end up raising their expected future payoffs in equilibrium. Including such forms of strategic behavior thus reduces cheap talk by creating a credible electoral system where candidates do as they say once elected.

Author

• Shiladitya Kumar, University of Houston