Anarchy, Arrangement, and the American Agenda: A Big-Data Analysis of U.S. International Institutional Design

• In Event: Law and Institutions

Abstract

International Relations scholars have transitioned from a primary focus on high-profile intergovernmental organizations to a broader exploration of the design of international institutions. This pivot recognizes the rich institutional designs states employ to pursue their interests. Still, most research is still compartmentalized, studying one type of institution rather than the whole “spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements” (Vabulas and Snidal 2013). To close this gap, we focus on all types of international institutions set up by the U.S. since 1945.
We prioritize the U.S. for several reasons. Its dominant post-WWII power played a significant role in molding institutional designs. Put bluntly, the U.S. is least likely to enter into institutions it does not consider in its own interest. By exploring U.S.’s engagements, we glean insights into how states navigate the anarchic global stage if they are left to their own devices and face comparatively few constraints. Additionally, the widespread use of English in international diplomacy and academia guarantees that we can compile a comprehensive representation of all U.S.-involved institutions. The comparatively transparent nature of the U.S. political system and availability of English documents enrich our research by allowing us to use machine learning to understand when the U.S. adopts which type of institution with whom and why.
Our empirical strategy draws from diverse datasets that encompass various international agreements. We anticipate our dataset to include roughly 10,000 agreements, mainly sourced from the UN Treaty Series. Our analysis aims to unravel how the U.S. shifts from anarchy to arrangements, pursuing its American agenda.

Author

• Markus Gastinger, University of Salzburg