How (Not) to Solve the Guardianship Dilemma: Institutional Counterbalancing and the Consequences of Military Control in Medieval China

• In Event: Historical Political Economy of China: New Research Frontiers

Abstract

What happens when a dictator tries to resolve the guardianship dilemma? We provide the first systematic, micro-level evidence on the implications of this dilemma, by investigating a counterbalancing strategy widely employed for military control – creating differing scopes of command that lead to fragmentation of authority within the military. We study a later part of the Tang Dynasty (769 - 877 CE), where powerful military generals ruled provinces across China with locally-raised armies. To strengthen civilian control of the military, the imperial government enacted a reform that institutionally weakened the generals’ authority over the local armies. From various archival and archaeological sources, we digitize and geocode information on local armies, military rebellions and mutinies, and civilian uprisings. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we document that this reform reduced the generals’ rebellions to the regime. Meanwhile, it reduced the generals’ ability to enforce order, both within the military and with respect to the local society. It led to an increase in soldier-led mutinies against generals, and an increase in the incidence of peasant uprisings against the regime. These findings highlight the sharp trade-offs associated with institutionally counterbalancing the military.

Authors

• Erik H Wang, New York University

• Joy Chen, Renmin University of China