Matriarch for the Patriarch: Female Regency and Political Stability in Historical Regimes

• In Event: Historical Political Economy of China: New Research Frontiers

Abstract

Smooth leadership succession is of paramount importance to regime stability. One grave challenge to the succession problem is the absence of an adult heir who is capable of ruling the state. In this case, a regency arrangement would be used, where a minor is selected as the nominal ruler and regent(s) are formally appointed to govern in the name of the ruler. Inherent in this regency arrangement, which is prevalent across many historical and contemporary regimes, is a commitment problem between the regent(s) and the young ruler. The former cannot credibly commit to keeping the latter in reign, while the latter cannot commit to keeping the former safe should s/he come of age and assume power. We argue that regency by the empress dowager (the mother or grandmother of the child emperor), a practice commonly adopted by imperial Chinese dynasties, helps alleviate this commitment problem. Since imperial China barred females from becoming heads of the state for cultural reasons, the incentives of the (grand)mother would be more closely aligned with the young emperor than with other contenders to the throne (e.g., powerful ministers). We test these arguments with original data on over one-hundred child emperors in imperial China. We find that regency by the empress dowager is associated with higher political stability---child emperors were less likely to be deposed when their (grand)mother acted as regent. We also explore the practice and implications of female regents in other political contexts.

Authors

• Zhenhuan Lei, Shanghai Jiao Tong University

• Xiuyu Li, New York University

• Joy Chen, Renmin University of China