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This article engages the construction of violent rebellion in Nigeria as being rooted in Islamic extremism rather than other, more secular, phenomena. Using a large-n survey of Nigerians conducted in 2012 and 2013, the authors interrogate correlations between respondent wealth, religiosity, and support of and sympathy for anti-state actors. We find that household monthly income reliably predicts willingness to accept violence as a force of change, readiness to justify violence in terms of ideological and religious beliefs, and commitment to extra-state violent actors – with additional wealth being correlated with additional acceptance and commitment. Conversely, level of religiosity is not significantly correlated with these measures on the national scale. However, this pattern is more complex in the Borno state of Nigeria – the region in which the violence attributed to these groups is greatest. Though income continues to affect respondent support for anti-state actors and their aims, the effect of religiosity becomes highly significant and of great magnitude at the Borno regional level. Religious respondents are less likely to support Islamist groups and their aims. Given these findings, we posit that Boko Haram and similar Nigerian Islamist movements may draw support not from expressions of religious devotion, but as a result of broader socio-economic phenomena.