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About Annual Meeting
The theoretical conversation about comparisons has been dominated by a relatively restrictive view as to what comparisons are good for and what kinds of comparisons are legitimate. The practice of comparison in the social and human sciences has of course always been more diverse; it is the aim of this paper to develop the theory of comparison beyond its restrictive assumptions. The paper begins by highlighting that comparison has been associated with one particular end, the end of causal explanation, and more specifically the end of linear causal explanation. This is partly rooted in the influence of the clinical trial on philosophies of the social sciences. I will then discuss a few other ends that comparisons have been useful for, such as description, concept-development, critique and different kinds of explanation. Lastly, I discuss a few forms of comparing that can be recognised as being useful once we broaden the ends that comparison can legitimately be used towards.