Putting Power in the Right Hands: A Person x Situation Approach to Leadership and Collective Action

• In Event: 272 - Regular Session. Rational Choice

Abstract

Peer-to-peer sanctioning is arguably the most widely studied solution to enhancing public good contributions. But giving one group member the sole ability to sanction his or her group members may be a less costly and more efficient method of maintaining fair and high group contributions. Note, however, that this outcome will obtain if the leader does not abuse his or her power, for instance, by free-riding on group efforts while punishing others for doing so. And much work suggests that having high power increases self-oriented behavior and decreases group-serving behavior. Thus, it is unclear whether installing a leader will ultimately be beneficial or harmful to groups facing collective action problems. Here we present a person x situation approach to group leadership, arguing that social value orientation of the leader moderates the impact of power on both leader behaviors and group outcomes. A laboratory experiment revealed that, compared to proself leaders, prosocial leaders contributed to group efforts at high levels despite facing no risk of punishment. In addition, prosocials led their group members to maintain high contributions over time compared to proself-led groups, because leader contributions significantly predicted followers’ subsequent contributions. Prosocial leaders were also more effective in maintaining high contributions than the standard peer-to-peer, or “all to all,” sanctioning system, and fewer resources were destroyed when only one person was responsible for punishment. We conclude that for proselfs, power corrupts. But for prosocials, power ennobles—and their groups succeed in maintaining a public good as a result.

Authors

• Ashley Lauren Harrell, University of South Carolina

• Brent Simpson, University of South Carolina