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About Annual Meeting
Emile Durkheim laid out one of the earliest sociological theories of punishment, arguing that punishment of crime has a salutary effect on society by reaffirming the collective consciousness of that society. This functional consequence of punishment results from (and is irrevocably tied to) the nature of crime, defined as an act that offends the collective consciousness present in all right-minded members of a society. Punishment sends a signal to all members of a society that society itself has been harmed and will not accept such harm. The result is a collective reaffirmation of the beliefs and principles held in common by the collective consciousness. With few exceptions, Durkheim assumed that criminal punishment is done on behalf of society. With the rise of prison privatization, this assumption is increasingly called into question, as firms carrying out punishment (i.e., incarceration), though legally agents of the state, act in their own interest. This is especially true of for-profit corrections corporations, whose actions are primarily geared toward appeasing shareholders. This paper takes up the following question: To what extent are any salutary effects of punishment dependent on the identity of the punisher? The paper addresses this question by examining Durkheim's writings on the matter, considering empirical patterns of privatized punishment in late modern United States, and proposing a series of hypotheses that may guide future attempts to understand what consequences privatized punishment may have for social solidarity and cultural understandings of punishment.