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Gray, Takeuchi, and Takeuchi (2008) have demonstrated that a Tit-for-Tat strategy, which often functions effectively in iterated prisoner’s dilemmas games, also characterizes small group interactions, particularly with respect to mutual rejection of suggestions in collective decision making in dyad. This study attempts to explain the Tit-for-Tat process by using a simple heuristic algorithm called “Take-The-Best” (TTB) and outlines the simulation structure of that process based on Bayesian probabilities. The multivariate analysis shows no significant difference between the simulation and the empirical data from our past study with regard to the variables that characterize dyadic decision making process. Possible limitations in the application of the simulation model to real human interactions are also discussed.