Ideology, Subjectivity and Mind in Animal Models and Infant Research: A Critical Discourse Analysis

• In Event: 276 - Section on Animals and Society Paper Session. Inequality and Animals

Abstract

Juxtaposing nonhuman animal and human infant research reveals how methodological ideologies and presuppositions about mind and behavior in nonverbal subjects are impacted by the species of the experimental subject. This paper uses Critical Discourse Analysis to analyze a sample of influential scientific articles (N=40) published between 1959 and 2011 on four experimental paradigms: a) a rhesus monkey model of attachment, b) a canine model of learned helplessness, c) a rodent model of pro-social behavior, and d) human infant eye-tracking studies. Analyses reveal differences between the animal and infant paradigms in a) representations of subjectivity, b) assumptions about the origin of behavior and the relationship between mind and behavior, and c) descriptions of mental states. Infants are represented as linguistic subjects but in animal paradigms behaviors, effects, or brain regions are the subjects. Infants are described as producing behavior whereas behavior is assumed to be produced in animals. Mind and behavior are seen as inextricably linked in infants yet discrete categories in animals. The animal (but not the infant) paradigms alternate between absolute (“depression”) and qualified (“depression-like”) descriptions of mental states. This problematizes the application of mental states to animals while simultaneously relying on mentalistic language to justify the experimental paradigm. I argue that comparisons of animal and infant research reveal latent ideologies of functionalism, humanism and speciesism and illustrate the falsity of the claim that scientific examinations of animal mind employ theoretically neutral methodologies and language.

Author

• Jessica Bell, Michigan State University