Smart, But Shifty: Trustworthiness and the Contingent Appeal of Network Brokers

• In Event: 161 - Section on Organizations, Occupation and Work Roundtable Session (one-hour).
  In Refereed Roundtable: Table 06. Social Capital and Networks II

Abstract

A wealth of research documents the workplace benefits of playing a brokerage role in social networks—occupying structural holes in social networks to control the flow of resources between individuals and groups—to both the brokers and the brokered. Far fewer studies have considered the risks to brokers that might be associated with playing this role. We proposed that the act of brokering creates for brokers a reputation for untrustworthiness with consequences for how they are treated in non-network situations. Experimental results showed that observers ascribed to brokers an untrustworthy reputation relative to people who did not broker. When tasks called for trust, brokers were overlooked as partners in favor of non-brokers. However, they were not judged universally in a negative light. In situations that did not require trust, but instead required diverse information sets, brokers were preferred. A third experiment using an investment game showed that people offered less of their endowment to brokers than to others, and perceptions of trustworthiness mediated this difference. Results demonstrate the potential tight rope brokers walk—they are valued for their diverse information, but viewed as untrustworthy in non-network situations.

Authors

• Eric Gladstone, Cornell University

• Kathleen Mary O'Connor, Cornell University