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Since its peak in 2004 when over 20,000 children were adopted from abroad by American parents, the rate of international adoptions has decreased steadily and dramatically. This trend is a reflection of substantial changes in national and international regulations that have led to long waiting times and a shortage of certain types of highly desirable children. Rather than showing the interrelated nature of economic and moral calculations in a growing or stable market, this analysis uses Kornai and Weibull’s (1978) model of an economy of shortage to investigate how adoption agency staff manages uncertainty in an economy where queuing and substitution have become necessary. Using interviews with adoption agency staff and participant observation in a California adoption agency, I show how adoption agencies manage the mismatch between the desires of adoptive parents and the availability of certain types of children. I find that agency staff make moral claims about why choosing an adoption program with a long waiting period is undesirable. Given the propensity to steer parents away from queuing, agency staff make moral claims about why it is important for families to expand their options; they counsel parents to make choices about the type of substitution that they feel most comfortable with and that is most acceptable for their family. Ultimately, this case demonstrates how the realities of the adoption economy and professional moral commitment to children and family welfare intermingle in a way that makes certain choices make sense while others seem unthinkable.