Search
Program Calendar
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Session Type
Browse By Topic
Personal Schedule
Sign In
Deadlines
Policies
Updating Your Submission
Requesting AV
Presentation Tips
Request a Visa Letter
FAQs
X (Twitter)
Search Tips
Annual Meeting App
About Annual Meeting
Amsden (1985, 1989) and Wade (1990) pointed to the central role of the state in the rapid industrialization of Taiwan and South Korea. Soon after, a new developmental state paradigm, which argues that all successful cases of “late industrialization” have been associated with a significant degree of state intervention, emerged to challenge the neo-classical, neoliberal vision of East Asian growth in terms of economic benefits of trade liberalization, private enterprise, and a restricted role of the state (Onis 1991).
However, the literature on the developmental states in East Asia seldom included post-socialist China in its discussion. This exclusion may be justifiable in the 1980s and even in the 1990s. However, in the light of the very rapid economic development of China in the first two decades of the 21st century, it seems necessary to re-examine the crucial research question of the role of the post-socialist party-state in China’s economic development.
In this paper, I first present the general characteristics of the developmental State in capitalist East Asia. Then I will examine how the China’s post-socialist state is similar to (or different from) the developmental states of its East Asian neighbors. After that, I will examine the various high-tech initiatives of the post-socialist state in promoting an indigenous innovation state. In the end, I will discuss the implication of the case of post-socialist China on developmental state research.