Search
Program Calendar
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Session Type
Browse By Topic
Personal Schedule
Sign In
Deadlines
Policies
Updating Your Submission
Requesting AV
Presentation Tips
Request a Visa Letter
FAQs
X (Twitter)
Search Tips
Annual Meeting App
About Annual Meeting
Recently, sociologists have expended much effort in attempts to define social “mechanisms.” We intervene in these definitional debates by asking not what mechanisms are, but instead how sociologists use the concept of “mechanism” to construct explanations. To this end, we propose a tripartite classification of strict-substantial, formal, and metaphorical mechanistic explanation. We suggest that a more complete theory of mechanistic explanation in sociology must appropriately parse these three approaches to draw out the implicit evaluative criteria appropriate to each; doing so will reveal quite different preferences for explanatory scope and nuance hidden under the ubiquitous term “social mechanism.” Moving beyond extensive debates about realism and anti-realism in sociology, we argue prescriptively against “mechanistic fundamentalism” for sociology, and for a more pluralistic understanding of social causality. This argument sits in tension with approaches to explanation that take parsimony as a primary epistemic value.