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About Annual Meeting
A great deal of political violence arises not through the escalation of peaceful street demonstrations into violence, but rather through the acts of clandestine groups that have already given up on peaceful public protest. This paper contributes to the study of causal mechanisms involved in the onset and perpetuation of clandestine political violence. It expands on the model developed by Donatella della Porta by exploring the additional mechanism of accidental escalation. Accidental escalation creates points of no return that affect the behavior of the clandestine group as well as how it is perceived by security agencies and the general public, and may also alter the broader context. The study explores the mechanism of accidental escalation in four case examples from interrelated Japanese armed clandestine groups that emerged out of the New Left protest cycle of the late 1960s and operated in Japan and abroad during the 1970s. The research is based on long-term fieldwork with the groups in question. The cases include accidental escalations in the Yodogō hijacking of 1970 and the group’s subsequent activities in North Korea; the Asama Sansō Siege and the United Red Army Purge of 1972; the Japanese Red Army and the Invasion of the French Embassy in The Hague in 1974; and the Bombing of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Headquarters in Tokyo by East Asia Anti-Japanese Armed Front in 1974.