Trojan Horses in Linked Fields: Economists, Lawyers and the Transformation of U.S. Antitrust Policy

• In Event: 051 - Regular Session. Economic Sociology. Law and Regulation in Economic Life

Abstract

Between 1965 and 1981, U.S. antitrust policy shifted dramatically from a high-enforcement position to a laissez-faire one. At the same time, economists replaced lawyers as the dominant kind of antitrust expert. This paper examines how the shift in the dominant mode of expertise helped change merger policy at the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. Before the 1960s, economists played little role in the Antitrust Division. But in the mid-60s, a time when mainstream economists largely agreed with pro-enforcement lawyers, economists were able to establish an avatar (Abbott 2005) that linked the academic field with the policy field. In the decade that followed, economists continued to gain influence, but the mainstream position on mergers in academic economics reversed. Economists’ newfound influence allowed them to change policy as a result. Establishing an avatar was hard when economists agreed with lawyers; it seems unlikely to have succeeded if economists had been anti-enforcement in the 1960s. I suggest that an avatar can, in linking two fields, sometimes serve as a Trojan horse: gaining influence when its approach is unthreatening to a dominant group, but evolving with its field of origin in ways that introduce conflict and change.

Author

• Elizabeth Popp Berman, State University of New York-Albany