Relative power: Material and Contextual Elements of Efficacy in Social Dilemmas

• In Event: 206 - Regular Session. Rational Choice

Abstract

In cooperative situations where the production of a collective good depends on reaching a minimum threshold of cooperation (Step-Level Public Good), cooperative behavior is rational for selfish individuals when their contribution is likely to be the deciding factor in whether the minimum threshold is reached. An individual’s estimate of the probability that his or her contribution causes the collective good to be produced is known as his or her efficacy (e.g. Kerr 1992). The present research identifies two distinct components of efficacy – material efficacy and contextual efficacy. We present evidence from two experimental studies suggesting that material and contextual efficacy have distinct and significant effects on individual behavior in Step-Level Public Good games. Our results are mixed on the direction and shape of the effect contextual efficacy has on cooperative behavior, but suggest that taking into account contextual information available to players in a Step-Level Public Good game is important in theoretical explorations and in designing empirical tests of the efficacy-cooperation hypothesis.

Authors

• Dieko M Bakker, University of Groningen

• Jacob Dijkstra, University of Groningen