Search
Program Calendar
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Session Type
Browse By Topic
Personal Schedule
Sign In
Deadlines
Policies
Updating Your Submission
Requesting AV
Presentation Tips
Request a Visa Letter
FAQs
X (Twitter)
Search Tips
Annual Meeting App
About Annual Meeting
Deliberating juries draw on commonsense notions of what counts as “normal” behavior in distinguishing facts which are inculpatory from those that lend themselves to a more innocent interpretation. Though this is a commonplace observation, prior research has shed little light on the underlying model(s) of normalcy—which means that we know very little about “what everybody knows.” This article takes a generative approach to inculpatory statements made by two real-life juries deliberating the same case. First I enumerate the distinct assertions made, by implication, about normal, innocent people (NIPs). Then I reduce these to a smaller number of generative principles revolving around the even more general themes of rationality, emotions, language, and relationships. The results illuminate some of the underlying principles of common sense as it is invoked in the jury room, and allow for the critical evaluation of commonsense assumptions in light of social-scientific research.