Ethnic Conflict and Electoral Preferences in Turkey

• In Event: 053 - Regular Session. Ethnic Conflict

Abstract

Are emergency zones effective counterinsurgency measures? In response to the Kurdish rebellion, the Turkish state put thirteen provinces under emergency rule (1987-2002). By circumventing rule of law, the state contained the insurgency but its repressive tactics pushed voters away from the political mainstream. An ethnic party emerged during the war and received substantial electoral support from this territory. In this paper, we investigate the link between emergency rule and ethnic vote. First, using matching methods, we show that provinces put under emergency rule were more likely to vote for the ethnic party. Second, using district level data, we investigate which counterinsurgency practices worked as a mechanism to connect emergency rule to ethnic vote. We find that detentions targeting civilians systematically shifted electoral preferences toward the ethnic party. These results show that indiscriminate violence may help win the war on military grounds but comes with unintended consequences for the counterinsurgent.

Authors

• Cem Emrence, State University of New York-Binghamton

• Aysegul Aydin, University of Colorado-Boulder