Agency and Conformity: Explaining Variations in the Bureaucratization of the Human Resource Function in Smaller Enterprises

• In Event: 245 - Regular Session. Organizations: Determinants of Diffusion

Abstract

In this paper, we argue that variations in conformity to institutional prescriptions may be explained within a neo-institutional framework that provides a role for self-interested action and power. We posit that conformity is influenced both by key actors’ calculations of the potential costs and benefits of adhering to institutional prescriptions, and by their relative power within the organization. Premised on previous research suggesting the existence of institutional pressures towards increasing bureaucratization of the human resource (HR) function in modern organizations, we explore our arguments using a nationally representative sample of small and medium-size British enterprises. We focus on the conjoint effects of two firm characteristics, ownership structure (i.e., the presence of a single, dominant owner versus divided ownership) and being publicly-held, on bureaucratization of HR, and find that bureaucratization is greatest in public firms with a single dominant owner and lowest in private firms with a single dominant owner. These results are consistent with our arguments that top-level members consciously consider the trade-off between potential rewards and costs of conformity to institutional pressures for bureaucratization, and that the ability of members to realize their preferences (for either greater or lesser conformity) is affected by the distribution of power.

Authors

• Joon Woo Woo Sohn, Cornell University

• Pamela S. Tolbert, Cornell University