Self as a Second-order Object: Reinterpreting the Jamesian “Me”

• In Event: 606 - Section on Social Psychology Roundtable Session (co-sponsored with Section on Sociology of Emotions)
  In Refereed Roundtable: Table 05. Self and Identity

Abstract

Existing definitions of the self can be grouped into three types: self as self-reflectivity, self as self-concept, and self as the individual. This article traces current disagreements over the definition of the self to a crucial ambiguity in William James’s original delineation of the “Me.” Implicit in James’s delineation was a distinction between first-order objects and second-order objects: while first-order objects are things as they are, independent of the perception of a knowing subject, second-order objects are things as they are perceived, in connection with the perception of a knowing subject. This article makes this distinction explicit and argues that the self is a second-order object associated with the first-personal or “emic” perspective. Defined as the empirical existence of the individual perceived by the individual as “me” or “mine,” the self is distinguished from the “I” which is the mental capacity for self-reflection, the self-concept which is the mental representation of the individual’s existence, and the individual which is the empirical referent of the self-concept. As a second-order object, the “Me,” i.e. the self, is the unity of the existence and perception of the individual.

Author

• Shanyang Zhao, Temple University