The Limits of Indirect Rule: Internal Colonialism, Non-State Revenue and Nationalism in Corsica

• In Event: 146 - Regular Session. Nations/Nationalism

Abstract

Recent studies have analyzed how indirect rule can help to contain nationalism and why states choose to adopt it for management of their sub-state regions. Indirect rule, defined as an external power’s “cooptation of notables sitting atop relatively rigid hierarchical social systems”. Indirect rule entails the appearance of political self-rule, but entails dependence on external support. This paper develops and tests a theory that highlights the limits of indirect rule and the conditions under which it falls apart. We argue that the efficacy of indirect rule depends upon the principal’s monopoly over revenue, which shapes the potential for oppositional mobilization. A monopoly enables the agent to distribute goods to the subjects in peripheral regions, and serves as the main source of legitimacy. However, when there are alternative sources of revenue, multiple principals can emerge, which creates an opportunity for nationalist parties. We test this theory using unique local-government level data from Corsica. In this way, we are able to explain the conditions under which indirect rule can endure or break apart, and contribute to the literatures on nationalism and strategies to contain it.

Authors

• David Siroky, Arizona State University

• Sean Mueller, University of Berne

• Michael Hechter, Arizona State University