Threat, Deterrence, and Penal Severity: Flogging in the Royal Navy, 1740-1820

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  In Refereed Roundtable 60min: Table 09. From Empirics to Theory

Abstract

Classical perspectives on punishment require modification because they pay too little attention to the punishers. We develop a neo-Durkheimian theory of penal severity that proposes that when those in authority feel threatened they will punish more profusely, even if so doing compromises the broader goals of social control. We employ a unique data set comprised of a random sample of Royal Navy ships during the Age of Sail to analyze the practice of summary punishment by flogging. Our study shows that both local and global factors associated with perceptions of threat by enforcement officers are associated with greater penal severity. Dispositions toward crime and punishment shaped during a time of revolutionary crisis after 1789 influenced the frequency and severity of punishment inflicted on subordinates, even after the original crisis receded. Not only did punishment become more frequent and severe but the reasons that commanders gave for the floggings they inflicted changed in the revolutionary era, undermining the claims of general deterrence theory and revealing growing social distance and conflict between officers and seamen.

Authors

• Patrick Underwood, University of Washington

• Steven Pfaff, University of Washington

• Michael Hechter, Arizona State University