Inertia and Public Bureaucracy: The Imprint of the Bureaucrat

• In Event: 078 - Section on Sociology of Culture Refereed Roundtable Session
  In Refereed Roundtable 100min: Table 17. Nations, Collective Memories, and Immigration

Abstract

We analyze how policy preferences of bureaucrats result in inertia and policy rigidity. In particular, we develop a theoretical framework that synthesizes insights from the theory of organizational imprinting with budget-maximization in the tradition of Niskanen. It becomes apparent that budget-maximization strategies are nested in early imprints of bureaucracy. Imprints of the past define the arena in which budget-maximization takes place, and they have a decisive effect on the individual behavior of bureaucrats. As a result policy reforms towards better bureaucratic control must distinguish clearly between measures targeted at the individual behavior of bureaucrats and the imprinted institutional environment.

Authors

• Shaheen Naseer, Erasmus University Rotterdam

• Klaus Heine, Erasmus University Rotterdam