Patronage Cycles: Evidence from Local Elections in Indononesia

• In Event: 339 - Section on Rationality and Society Paper Session and Business Meeting. Empirical Tests of Purposive Behavior

Abstract

Elections are a crucial tool for voters to hold their representatives accountable and improve the provision of public goods. At the same time, in the context of developing democracies, characterized by low programmatic credibility of candidates and clientelistic linkages, elections can also induce distortionary policies. We connect the literatures on political budget cycles and clientelism to argue that elections will induce costly and cyclical patronage hiring. We test this argument using a unique natural experiment from the Indonesian context. We exploit the exogenous phasing-in and timing of local direct elections in Indonesian districts and detailed teacher censuses to document a noticeable increase in contract teacher hiring in election years. Drawing on more general data on personnel expenditures, we show that the logic of patronage hiring extends to other policy sectors. Last, we show that the distortionary effect of elections is mediated by candidates' ability to make credible programmatic campaign promises.

Authors

• Jan Pierskalla, Political Science Department, Ohio State University

• Audrey Sacks, World Bank