Collective Goods and the Propensity to Protest: Testing A Structural-Cognitive Model of Collective Action

• In Event: 339 - Section on Rationality and Society Paper Session and Business Meeting. Empirical Tests of Purposive Behavior

Abstract

Drawing on rational choice theories of selective incentives, critical mass theories of production functions, and interactionist theories of collective action frames, this article specifies an integrated theory of student protest against tuition increases. The authors administered a factorial survey, in which the social context of student protests is varied by randomizing dimensions of the context, which correspond to theoretical independent variables predicting likelihood that the protest will succeed and propensity to protest. The analysis, using a multi-level mixed-effects structural equation model, yields four major results. First, contrary to resource mobilization perspectives, the magnitude of the grievance (tuition increase) is strongly related to protest success and propensity. Second, consistent with utility theories of selective incentives, both positive and negative selective incentives affect the likelihood of protesting. Third, number of participants is positively associated at a diminishing rate with likelihood that the protest succeeds and that the respondent will join the project, suggesting decelerating production and mobilization functions, and negative interdependence among protestors. Fourth, likelihood of success mediates much of the effect of social context on propensity to protest, implying that actors consider the effect of incentives on their own behavior and that of other potential protestors as well.

Authors

• Ross L. Matsueda, University of Washington

• Blaine G. Robbins, University of Washington

• Steven Pfaff, University of Washington