A Man Is Known by His Cup: Signaling Commitment via Costly Conformity

• In Event: 369 - Section on Organizations, Occupations, and Work. Making Organizational Compliance Real

Abstract

Why do unpopular norms persist? Existing approaches see this issue as an information problem, where individuals misconstrue a norm as popular and conform so as to fake their endorsement. But even when actors know of a norm’s unpopularity, conformity often seems to continue. My theory and evidence identify when and why individuals conform to such a visibly unpopular norm by focusing on the need to signal commitment in relationships. While navigating uncertainties in relationships, actors often need to discern whether their relationship partners are committed to collective interests over their private interests. In this context, a conformist to a visibly unpopular norm appears willing even to violate her personal interest to meet a behavioral standard set out by the community (i.e., norm). Therefore, conformity to a visibly unpopular norm signals greater commitment to collective interests than does nonconformity. I leverage the case of a visibly unpopular norm around drinking in after-hour gatherings in South Korea and show that such costly conformity credibly signals commitment. A macro implication is that an unpopular norm might persist not despite its unpopularity, but precisely because of its (visible) unpopularity.

Author

• Minjae Kim, MIT Sloan School of Management