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About Annual Meeting
Many historical accounts of the social sciences during the Cold War claim, suggest, or insinuate that an epistemological homogeneity had permeated this field. This paper criticizes this homogeneity trope by focusing on a specific episode in Cold War social science, the creation and publication of a research article entitled “On the Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences” (Helmer and Rescher 1959). Published in 1959, the article proposed a pragmatic approach to problems of positivism in the philosophy of science. Its authors, Olaf Helmer and Nicholas Rescher, were both working for the RAND Corporation, the infamous Californian think tank predominantly concerned with problems deemed relevant to the US Air Force and the Pentagon. The analysis shows that despite their working environment and their philosophical allegiances, these researchers stretched and transgressed some of the core assumptions and conceptions of positivist philosophy of science, among them the idea that new knowledge can only originate in experience. The proposal of Helmer and Rescher was to enlarge the scope of this principle to include also the opinions of experts. Thus, they aimed at nothing less than a social epistemology for the inexact sciences.