Opening the "Black Box": Theorizing the Challenges to Social Movement Influence in the Legislative Process

• In Event: 1566 - Influence

Abstract

Even when social movements mobilize the masses, exploit political opportunities, and develop resonant frames, they often fall short of achieving their legislative policy objectives. Although social movement scholars have attempted to explain why this is the case, existing explanations are insufficient because they fail to take account of the inner workings of the legislative process itself, and the motivations of legislators. In this paper, we develop a theory of legislative conservatism that consistently works against social movements, making policy success fleeting. Pulling together new insights from a range of literatures in political science, political sociology, and public policy, and adding our own empirical evidence from two similar cases of legislative social movement mobilization that yielded very different outcomes, our theory accounts for the various motivations of legislators, the structure and incentives of the legislative process, and the role of political coalitions. We argue that disproportionate political power is concentrated in the hands of a small number of legislators with unique motivations and incentives. Specifically, these legislators respond to diverse, cross- cutting coalitions of interest groups, which provide them with a special form of legislative subsidy. Social movement organizations (SMOs) are unlikely to participate in such coalitions because of the threat of cooptation, their incompatibility with SMOs’ organizational identities, and their distinct style of lobbying. The resulting mismatch between what SMOs can offer legislators and what the most powerful legislators are looking for helps explain policy outcomes that SMOs find routinely disappointing.

Authors

• Joshua A. Basseches, Northwestern University

• Brayden G. King, Northwestern University