Public Goods Dilemma and Community Crime Prevention

• In Event: 2483 - Section on Collective Behavior and Social Movements Refereed Roundtable Session
  In Refereed Roundtable 60min: Table 10. Policy Outcomes of Social Movements

Abstract

The purpose of this work is to examine crime prevention as a social dilemma, specifically a public goods game. This paper discusses the collective action component of a model for Community Crime Prevention. Through rational choice approaches, this paper examines how individuals are incentivized to participate/cooperate in actions that involve community engagement. Using rational choice, this paper proposes a model for individual cooperation, which is adapted from an Elinor Ostrom model, and illustrates this model through neighborhood watch. This model consist of variables, such as face to face communication, trust, and reciprocity, as a means to evaluating the levels of participation and cooperation within public goods dilemma of community crime prevention.

Author

• Jonathan Coats, Alabama A&M University