Search
Program Calendar
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Session Type
Personal Schedule
Sign In
Deadlines
Policies
Updating Your Submission
Accessible Presentation
FAQs
X (Twitter)
Search Tips
About Annual Meeting
This study explores how charitable giving can be used as a signal of trustworthiness. For this goal, the author proposes the intrinsic benefit model of signaling, which allows to incorporate subjective perception into the signaling theory. The study focuses on how the signaling environments – in particular, the possibility that a donation is motivated for the signaling motive – will affect the dynamics of signaling and charitable giving. A laboratory experiments based on trust game was conducted to test the propositions. Contrary to the previous studies, donation was not used as a signal of trustworthiness, even though donators were more trustworthy than non-donators. Similarly, there was no evidence that the knowledge of subsequent trust game increased the likelihood of donations. However, the finding indicates that the awareness of the possibility that the donations were made for image motive may have reduced the level of transfer in the trust game, regardless of the actual donation made by their partner. The implications of the findings are discussed.